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5 Less than lIleets the eye 
Democratic legitimacy and 
deliberative tl'leory 
l\Jiclzael Saward 
, 
Deliberative models have dominated democratic theory far the past ten years. This 
chapter argues that, in some prominent versions at least these models are funda­
mentally fla'wed. Criticism of the deliberative model is not new; ho\vever, few 
critics challenge the most basic assumptions of that model. preferring to argue on 
the ground set out by the deliberationists themselves. 1',,1y aim is to suggest that 
deliberative theory lacks basic coherence and consistency. and that it contains 
worrying elitist threads. The major shortcomings that I focus upon are: the 
models' claims to legitimacy; their reliance on metaphor; and their exclusiveness. 
I proceed by examining, in turn, legitimacy, the siting of deliberative democracy, 
the vvork of Cohen, and the Schumpeterian problem (especially as it is raised in 
the work of OfTe). 
First a word about the context of this critique. ~Iy present task is a negative 
one: elucidating the flaws in deliberative democracy. For my part, the more 
positive side of the story lies in regarding direct democracy as the best most 
defensible aspiration for the democratic future. If we. as democrats, are to take 
citizenship seriously and treat citizens equall)~ then democratic legitimacy can only 
properly be conceived of as voting for the outcomes olle prefers in the context of 
an 'open society'. Of course, appropriate deliberation is a good thing, useful 
\\'ithin a larger framevvork facilitating direct participation and decision. However, 
that deliberation is democratically secondary, a (difficult, complex) matter of 
tweaking more fundamental features of a defensible conception of democracy (see 
Saward 1998 fiJr an elaboration of this view, and Budge 1996 and in this volume 
tar compatible arguments). 
Deliberative detnocracy and politicallegititnacy 
The deliberative model's proponents even some relatively critical ones- display 
a profound confidence in its theoretical and political importance. In my vic\\,: this 
confidence is displayed most dearly in the connections commonly made between 
delibtTation alld political legitimacy. To cite some prominent examples: lV[anin 
(1987: 351-2) argues that 'the source of legitimacy [of political decisions] is not 
the predetermined \vill of indi\"iduals . , . , 1mt rather the process of its formation, 
that is, deliberation itself'; Bohman and Rehg (1997a: ix), in their introduction to 
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a major volume on this model, state baldly that '[b]roadly defined, deliberative 
democracy refers to the idea that legitimate la\;vrnaking arises from the public 
deliberation of citizens'; Joshua Cohen, in what may be the most-cited article in 
the deliberative canon, is even more forthright when he claims that 'outcomes 
are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of free and 
reasoned agreement among equals' (1989); and Benhabib argues that 'legitimacy 
in complex democratic societies must be thought to result from the free and 
unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern' 
(1996a: 68). These are major, powerful claims. Are they warranted? 
Voting and aggregation 
Even the most convinced deliberationists concede that voting (and some version of 
majority rule) wilJ playa role in deliberative democracy. Cohen notes briefly; 
en passant - that' [e]ven under ideal conditions there is no promise that consensual 
reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, then deliberation concludes with 
voting, subject to some form of majority rule' (1989: 23). The concessions, when 
they come, are so muted that we could forgive Przeworski his comment that 
'deliberation theorists . . . wish away the vulgar fact that under democracy 
deliberation ends in voting' (1998: 141; see also Miller 1993a; Elster 1998a: 14). 
Regarding voting as a significantly lesser source of political legitimacy than 
deliberation (of a certain type) is mainstream for deliberationists and highly 
marginal in more full-blown and influential accounts of political legitimacy. I 
suggest that its mainstream status is in large part the product of the blinkered, 
artificially self-contained character of the 'deliberative model', which in turn is 
the product of the terms in which a good deal of influential deliberative theory is 
produced (see the detailed discussion of the example of the work of Cohen, below). 
Voting and elections are subsumed bydeliberationists under the 'aggregative' 
model of democracy. This aggregative model variously involves: atomistic (liberal) 
individualism; secret voting on the basis of 'pre-given', 'non-deliberative' prefer­
ences; self-interested voting; and the absence of consideration of the 'common 
good'. It is standardly presented as a black-and-white contrast to the deliberative 
model, \;vith one model unambiguously good, the other bad. 
However, there is a sleight of hand involved in this. For example, Benhabib 
': 1 996a) bebrins her analysis with 'the deliberative model of democracy'. Tagging 
'democracy'to 'deliberative' by initial stipulation immediately brackets off liberal) 
individualistic and majoritarian - 'aggregative' ways of thinking about democ­
racy. It does so in a way that implies that the deliberative model is self-sufficient 
- that deliberation of a certain sort could indeed be the major ingredient in an 
ideal but fully functioning and practical democratic system. 
\Vhatever the merits of the specific features of the deliberative models they 
advocate, writers such as Benhabib and Cohen' not only under-rate considerab1y 
the basic· fact that majority votes must decide democratic outcomes where, 
even after deliberation, views conflict; more broadly, they do not appear to take 
sufficiently on board the fact that the rnodern state is inevitably; structurally 
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hierarchical, secretive, and unequal in the resources it grants to participants in and 
against its processes. \Vhile deliberation may "veil be an ideal part of democratic 
processes, it can only be a part; it can be seen neither as the totality of a 
democratic decision-making process, nor appropriately practised in any and all 
key institutions in a democratic system. In short. this is not properly a 'model of 
democracy', but rather a desirable ingredient within a larger theory of democracy; 
an element within a more encompassing, more complex system of democratic 
structures - many of them 'aggregative' - rather than a self-contained substitute 
for some other, inherently separate model of democracy 
The overdrawn contrast between aggregative and deliberative models also 
lumps together factors that operate to the detriment of voting as a legitimating 
mechanism in democracies. The key point here is that voting, and preparing to 
vote, in elections or referendums need not be tarred with the brush of ignorant, 
isolated individualism. Can we not 'deliberate' in private- by reading, listening 
and thinking; by mulling over desirable candidates or outcomes? Responding to 
the maximalist claims about legitimacy that many deliberationists make, Fearon 
asks: 'does deliberation [have] to involve discussion rather than being a solitary 
affair? Surely it is possible to deliberate privately: \veighing reasons and arguments 
in a mental dialogue, even if this might not be as consequentially effective as 
deliberation via discussion?' (1998: 61). In other \vords, could not circumstallces 
quite different from, and more realistic than, idealized free, reasoned, uncoerced 
deliberation among equals in public, be an important contributor to political 
legitimacy? Indeed, I will suggest that key deliberationists themseLYt's rely in their 
arguments upon the reasoning capacities of abstract, isolated individuals; 
implicitly, these writers provide 'aggregationists' with much unintended support. 
So. deliberation-as-legitimacy is mainstream for deliberationists in part because 
of under-defended assumptions about what can correctly be loaded into all 
'aggregative' categOlJ~ and in part due to the linguistic slipperiness involved in 
positing the deliberative model as a self-sufficient model of democracy. I 
The broader view of political IegitiInacy 
Deliberation or a certain kind may well contribute to the legitimacy of outcomes; 
it is not my intention to argue that the deliherationists have nothing useful to 
say on the matter. But surely a three-dimensional \,iew of what may produce 
legitimacy must take (much) more into account. The absence of recognition of this 
basic point in the deliberationists' writings highlights the curiously hermt'tic nature 
of deliberative theory. vVithout wishing to go into this point too fal~ let me suggest 
Beetham's (1992a) account of 'the legitimation of power' as a suitable counter­
point. Beetham argues, in my view com:incingl)l; that political pmver can be 
legitimized by (1) its beillg exercised according to legally valid rules~ (2) the 
grounding of those rules in terms of shared beliefs (about the source of authority 
and the structuring of the system so it might serve the common good). and 
(3) its being the product of express consent. Each of these is no doubt ,i.taL but 
imagine in particular that the third criterion is absent - there is little evidence of 
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(genuine, equal, universal) express consent, that is, actual consent by at least a 
majority of those subject to the laws of a political community: Ultimately; can 
democratic legitimacy exist absent fair popular voting on the basis of universal 
adult suffrage, in principle regardless of the extent to which the preferences 
or interests that inform people's votes are shaped by deliberative procedures? If 
deliberationists answer no - if they give the democratic answer - they undermine 
their grand claims about deliberation producing legitimacy. If they answer yes, 
then profound questions must be asked about the democratic credentials of 
'deliberative democracy'. This is a vital theme, to which I shall return in a brief 
discussion of the work of Claus Offe in a later section. 
There might be a deliberationist response to this challenge, along the following 
lines: in advanced societies, democracy can and should mean more than the 
aggregation of preferences, however vital the latter remains as a democratic 
baseline requirement. Preference aggregation is the first step on the democratic 
ladder, deliberative forums a later, compatible, desirable development. This view 
has a reasonable hue about it, but note that it is not one that, to my knowledge, 
deliberative theorists have articulated. Even then, thin ice abounds. This amounts 
to an argument that non-democracies, and as yet unconsolidated democracies, 
must innovate as 'we' did before they can innovate as we ought. There are 
powerful echoes here with the arguments of John Stuart Mill in Cons£derat£ons on 
Representative Government (1975), who argued that certain backward peoples were not 
yet ready for 'real' democracy (and even at 'home', plural voting should be 
employed to factor in differential degrees of readiness for active democratic 
citizenship). Powerful reminders too of the parochial nature of much deliberative 
theory despite the universal-sounding language of its proponents (in the literature, 
only Gutmann and Thompson (1996) explicitly acknowledge that they are writing 
about processes appropriate to one country, the US). 
In sum, the surprising parochialism, assumed universality and assumed 
superiority of the 'deliberative model' feed into a highly inadequate account of 
legitimacy - an account that lies at the heart of the deliberationists' concerns. But 
that is not all. 
Differentiallegithnacy 
According to the deliberationists, political legitimacy is (above all) a product of 
deliberation. But what does it mean to 'deliberate'? Cohen writes that: 
When properly conducted ... democratic politics involves public deliberation 
focused on the common good, requires some form of manifest equalif:J1 among citizens, 
and shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute to the 
formation of a public conception of the common good. 
(1989: 19) 
This conception may represent an 'ideal', which we can only try to 'mirror' as best 
we can in real procedures. Presumably, 'fully legitimate' policy (or candidate 
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election) would result from an accurate mirroring of the ideal in practice. But how 
then do ',\lC account for less-than-fully legitimate outcomes, which aI'e the product 
of less-than-ideal deliberative procedures or forums? On the presumption that no 
deliberative theorist would want·to say that a real procedure that is more than 
a marginal deviation from the ideal results in clearly non-legitimate outcomes, 
"ve must be prepared to entertain the notion of differential degrees of legitimacy 
flovving from differing degrees of approximation of actual procedures to the ideal. 
But how many degrees, how many categories of semi-legitimacy, must 'vve allow 
between the near-ideal and the wholly non-deliberative? ,",Vho is to decide? 
The answer must be that it is a su~jective matter;. akin in some ways to efforts 
in democratic theory to pin down measures of preference intensity. Given its 
subjectivity, we can expect reasonable disagreement on the measures (even if we 
do not demand of them categorical precision; c( Dryzek, this volume), raising 
major doubts about basic ideas of democratic legitimacy. And all that is premised 
upon a single dimension of degrees of differential approximation to the ideal. If, 
more realisticall)~ we allow for multiple dimensions (as suggested in Cohen's 
remarks, quoted above), we find ourselves in even murkier depths. Consider: 
deliberation involves discussion, but what sort? Among how many people? On 
what range of issues must it be repeated? Over what time frame? !\Iust opinions 
change? (How much appropriate deliberation took place in the long, slow-moving 
voting queues across South Africa in its first democratic elections in 1994?) 
Each question would have many answers, some 'better' and some 'worse' from 
a deliberative perspective. Tracing the potential variants from answers to one 
question to answers to the others will rapidly result in hundreds if not thousands 
of possibilities. Thus~ on a realistic view, the deliberationist claims about demo­
cratic legitimacy descend into unworkable meaninglessness. 
Siting deliberative delllocracy 
Even there, I have set aside one crucial question: where does or should deliberation 
occur? \Vithin this volume, we have discussions of deliberation ill (among others): 
especially constructed micro-forums such as 'deliberative opinion polls' and 
citizens' juries (Fishkin and Luskin, Smith): supra-national committee networks 
(Eriksen); civil society broadly speaking (Rattila); and associations (Herreros). ror 
Rawls (1993), 'public reason' is best exercised by the Supreme Court. Others, 
such as lVlansbriclge (1996: 57) and Benhabib (1996a), evoke a broad 'public' 
sphere of 'protected enclaves' or 'subaltern counterpllblics'. In the words of 
I\Iansbridge, 
Interest groups, political parties, and social movements, as well as churches, 
workplaces, ad hoc political collectives, and consciousness-raising groups, 
provide different forms of protected enclaves, in which members legitimately 
consider in their deliberations not only what is good for the whole polity but 
what is good for themselves individually ... and for their group. 
(1996:57) 
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Table 5.1 A typology of deliberative forums 
Deliberativeforum Formal IrifOrmal 
RejJresentative A Parliament and linked B Deliberative opinion polls 
institutions such as Select 'which are not state­
Committees; deliberative sponsored; citizens' juries; 
opinion polls linked to some 'focus groups' 
referendums or initiatives? 
JVOll-representative C Supreme or High courts 
with constitution­
interpreting functions; 
cabinets in appointive 
systems (e.g. US) 
D Associations (state­
sponsored or otherwise); 
political parties (state­
funded or othenvise, 
especially in multi-party 
systems); 'protected 
enclaves'; 'subaltern 
counterpublics'; 'discursive 
designs' 
Benhabib (1996a) also reminds us that traditional parliaments must be a key part 
of the picture. 1\105t interestingly, Cohen goes part way down a similar route. In 
his earlier comments on deliberative democracy, Cohen cites publicly-funded 
political parties as the desirable potential forums for deliberative democracy in 
practice; parties, he contends, 
can provide the more open-ended arenas needed to form and articulate the 
conceptions of the common good that provide the focus of political debate in 
a deliberative democracy. . . . The question is how we can best approximate 
the deliberative conception. And it is difficult to see how that is possible in the 
absence of strong parties, supported with public resources. 
(Cohen 1989: 32) 
Later, he writes how the use of public power to 'encourage the development of the 
right kinds of secondary association' could facilitate the creation of new 'delib­
erative arenas', or 'schools for deliberative democracy' (Cohen 1996: 110-13). 
The issue of siting raises many fascinating theoretical and institutional issues. 
I confine myself here to comments that pertain to democratic legitimacy; if 
deliberation is to make'a (the?) major contribution to political legitimacy, then the 
prominence and inclusiveness of the site(s) for deliberation are clearly vital. First: 
consider a simple typology of possibilities (see Table 5.1). 
The formal or informal dimension concerns whether or not the forum has 
any constitutionally stipulated political function such that the outcomes from an 
institution's deliberations become, or must formally be taken into account in 
the making of, government policy. The representative or non-representative 
dimension'concerns whether or not some plausible claim to be broadly represen­
tative of the ·..vider population of the 'master' political community is tenable (in 
either elective or statistical terms). 
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Among more influential deliberative democrats, for example, Ravvls sites 
deliberation in C, Fishkin primarily in B, and Cohen, Benhabib and Dryzek in 
D. Those who make the most expansive claims about political legitimacy site 
deliberative forums in Box D. But institutional designs in Box D are not decisive 
of the content of government policy and can make no significant claims to be 
representative of the \vider community (unless via some democratically dubious 
claim of <virtual representation) To focus on Cohen's views, neither political 
parties nor secondary associations as sites for deliberation (f(}Cused on the public 
good, etc.) can possibly prO\'ide the level and depth of legitimating force the 
whole thrust of his theory requires. Parties are partial- they represent members' 
views, and are animated by sectional interests (one need not be an out-and-out 
Downsian to accept this). As far as I can see, the only type of political party that 
could in theory approach the role Cohen asks of it would be the single party 
in a one-party state; in the words of Julius Nyerere, '... where there is one 
part)~ and that party is identified with the nation as a \"hole, the foundations of 
democracy are firmer than they ever can be where you have two or more parties, 
each representing only a section of the eommunity' (quoted in Nursey-Bray 
1983: 105). 
:'Much more should be said on this poillt no doubt. HO\vevel~ I shall merely put 
the question: if deliberation is so vital to legitimacy, why not formalize it and put 
it on a representative basis? Surely any reasonable claim to legitimacy rests upon 
such moves. This is not to say that informal, societal df'libf'ration is not a good 
thing; by and large. I do not see how it could be otherwise. However, despite the 
crucial nature of deliberation to democracy according to the model's advocates~ 
the nOll-state is preferred to the state (Dryzek 1990) and the local and partial to the 
general (Barber I 98:l; Cohen 1989 and 1996). This in turn raises the key issue that 
leads us to the next section. 
The underInining Inetaphor: a critique of Cohen 
In my vieyv, to put the point too bluntly, the foundations of the 'deliberative model' 
are in fact non-deliberative. I am not referring here to the temporal argument that 
any deliberative procedure must in practice have non-ddiberative origins (see 
~Iichelman 1998) I take that to be self-evident and uncontroversial. Rather. that 
. . 
a certain style of political theorizing Rawlsian theorizing provides both the 
unacknowledgeahle architecture and the metaphorical force for the deliberative 
model. One upshot of this is that the deliberation that is generaL indusive, 
universal, equaL face-to-face, and the source of political legitimacy is only 
expressible as such because it is purely hypotheticaL and it is so because the 
Rmvlsian 'original position' (Rawls 1972) apparently now an historical curiosity­
among theoretical devices, and downgraded in significance by Rawls himself 
(Rawls 1993) . lives on, all the more powerful for its being unsaid. Further, the 
basis of the definition of the original position in the Rawlsian idea of 'reflective 
equilibrium', and the closely linked notion of the 'four-stage sequence', provide 
fllrther unacknowledged metaphors at the heart or the architecture of the 
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deliberative model which (respectively) (a) undermine claims that proper deliber­
ation must be collective, and (b) highlight the intrinsic elitism and dislike of 
politics that characterize the 'deliberative model of democracy'. These are large 
claims, and I now turn to close examination of features of the influential work of 
Cohen in an effort to make good on them. 
In his oft-cited essay 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy' (1989), Cohen 
places at the core of his model of deliberative democracy the idea that people 
are 'committed' to deliberation: '... the aim of ideal deliberation is to secure 
agreement among all who are committed to free deliberation among equals ... ' 
(1989: 23); a commitment to deliberation 'carries \lvith it a commitment to advance 
the common good and to respect individual autonomy' (1989: 23). Where does this 
commitment come from? Clearly it is crucial, since on the face of it those who 
are uncommitted stand in danger of playing no part in deliberative democratic 
procedures. 
The answer is that it comes from a barely-disguised original position, in the 
form of a 'formal conception of deliberative democracy', whose explicit difIeren­
tiation from the original position serves only to highlight its original-position-like 
qualities and status in Cohen's work. 
Let us look in a little more detail at this argument. One way of cementing into 
place the commitment levels any fully deliberative democracy would require is to 
argue a motivational case: if people become accustomed to 'presenting reasons' in 
deliberative forums, then their commitment will be enhanced. If and when people 
feel more committed in this way; they \vill be less likely strategically to misrepresent 
their view in the deliberative forum (1989: 24). However, I suggest this particular 
argument depends on hope rather than conviction, and that it cannot do the work 
Cohen needs it to do for his strong view of commitment. 
Accordingly, Cohen must fall back on his alternative (and main) argument for 
(universal) commitment. But this alternative argument assumes universal commit­
ment merely by stipulating it. Cohen does this as part of his 'formal conception of 
deliberative democracy' a spelling out of an 'intuitive ideal' of a deliberative 
association (1989: 21). In this formal conception, Cohen stipulates that the 
members of an association share 'a commitment to co-ordinating their activities 
'l-vithin institutions that make deliberation possible and according to norms that 
they arrive at through their deliberation' (1989: 21). 
'tVhat is the status and origin of this 'formal conception'? Consider: Cohen 
begins his piece by citing Rawls. Dravving the view that 'When properly conducted 
... democratic politics involves public deliberation focused on the common good, 
requires some form of manifest equality among citizens, and shapes the identity 
and interests of citizens in vvays that contribute to the formation of a public 
conception of the common good' (1989: 19) from A Tlzeo1)! qf Justice, Cohen 
endorses Rawls' 'informal' argument for ordering political institutions, which 
holds that as far as is feasible actual arrangements should 'mirror' the ideal 
conditions of the original position. He then appears to distance himself from this 
derivation of key features of deliberation from the original position. He V\'Tites that 
the three key features he gets from Rawls 
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comprise elements of an independent and expressly political ideal that is 
focused in the first instance on the appropriate conduct of public affairs 011) 
that is, the appropriate way of arriving at collective decisions. And to under­
stand that ideal we ought not to proceed by seeking to 'mirror' ideal fairness 
in the fairness of political arrangements, but instead to proceed by seeking to 
mirror a system of ideal deliberation in social and political institutions. 
(1989: 20) 
In other words, this is not mirroring the arrangements of the original position, but 
rather mirroring a different deliberatively democratic, ideal. l\{y suggestion is that 
this move in the argument does not work - and it is important to see that it does 
not. By invoking Rawls and the original position, by deriving directly his key 
features of deliberation fi'om Rawls, by talking within the theoretical mind-set of 
A Tlle01} rif}llstice ('mirroring' of 'ideals' that are 'intuiti,'e'), by not specifying the 
status of his intuitive ideal except by immediate comparison ,vith Rawls's original 
position, by expecting that the very status of his construct as an intuitive ideal 
makes it theoretically compelling ~ Cohen betrays the origins of his 'formal 
conception'. Furthel~ the construction of the details of the formal conception gives 
the game away: it posits, for example, an 'independent association' that is to 
'continue into the indefinite future' (you do not knmv your generation behind the 
veil of ignorance?); self·interest does not exist: or if it does it is 'wholly subsumed 
under common commitments; the parties recognize each other as equals. l\'1ore 
broacll:~ the ideal deliberative model acts as a metaphor for the original position in 
its 'nowhereness': its face-to-face assumption~ the 'clean slate' quality of what it 
must consider, the fact that people are ironed-ouL bloodless and neutral. and that 
all people are 'there' nonetheless. In short, Cohen's formal conception and the 
ideal deliberative procedure derived ii'om it gain vvhate,-er theoretical power 
they have by invoking key features of the original position, by being presented in 
juxtaposition with the original position, and by doing the ,vork of the original 
position. It is the original position, hypothetical, nOll-deliberative (all are the same, 
therefore all are 011e·· the Rousseauian Lawgiver?) unless solitary-deliberatiH:, and 
- above all ~ an escape from politics 'whether deliberative or otherwise. 
Cohen's deliberative model represents democratic theory i11 Rawlsian thrall. 
RavAs, via the device of the four-stage sequence, effectively rules important 
constitutionaL issues out of ordinary politics; Cohen appears to invert the four­
stage sequence by placing a democratic ideal (the formal conception) in place 
of the original position: but as I have suggested he does not in fact do this. The 
architecture of the argument remains the same - the formal conception substi­
tuting for the original position. Therefore~ Cohen (in line with the Rawlsian 
four-stage sequence) too leaves little space for ordinary citizens to get their hands 
dirty with difficuk important political questions. \\That is unsaid can be as 
eloquent as what is said: Cohen can hardl'y avoid the solitary deliberation of 
rcflecti,.'e equilibrium~ though given the eHort to distance himself from Rawlsian 
techniques it is perhaps not surprising that he leaves the status of his intuitive ideal 
floating, unsupported by some fimctional substitute tor reflective equilibrium. 
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"'lhy does this matter? First, it tells us that much of the supporting framework 
Cohen employs is non-deliberative possibly anti-deliberative. Second, it vastly 
narrows the scope for deliberation, a point which (alongside those made earlier) sits 
very uncomfortably with tlle idea that deliberation is the source of legitimacy in 
politics. Third, it leaves Cohen with no real body which could possibly mirror his 
ideal ~ we cannot all meet and deliberate face-to-face ~ which helps to explain the 
hasty dive from the great heights of the theory to the advocacy of deliberation in 
political parties and secondary associations (see above). And fourth, if the foun­
dations for 'commitment' are inadequate, it opens Cohen's model to major 
charges of elitism, and anti-democracy: are the uncommitted - the unconvinced 
- to be excluded? On this point the mask rarely slips, but when it does it is 
revealing, as in an admission in Cohen's later work: 'Perhaps an ideal deliberative 
procedure is best institutionalized by ensuring well-conducted political debate 
among elites' (1996: 107). Many of the considerations I have sought to sketch here 
point to the fact that if democratic theory is in Rawlsian thrall it stands in danger 
of undermining itself: 
Rawls's political interest is ... reflected in the virtual absence of any dis­
cussion of democratic processes. He has less to say about the working of 
deliberative assemblies than he does about economic institutions and the 
agencies of the state that regulate them. 
(Esquith and Peterson 1988: 322) 
Further, as vValzer comments, this may be because the Rawlsian style is that of the 
'withdrawing and retiring' philosopher. Particular people in particular democratic 
communities will and "vill have the right to decide on the uses of the philos­
opher's systems. Walzer writes: '[tJhe philosopher himself ... is the only actual 
inhabitant of the ideal commonwealth, the only actual participant in the perfect 
meeting' (1981: 389). To my mind, this describes at one and the same time both 
Rawls's original position and Cohen's 'formal conception'2. 
Deliberative deDlocracy and exclusion: the 
SchuDlpeterian question 
As is well known, Schumpeter (1976) advocated a minimalist model of democracy; 
on his view, ordinary citizens so lacked a capacity for rationality and autonomous 
thought that, realistically, democracy could only mean elite rule and occasional 
choices among competing elites by citizens. A key charge thrown back at 
Schumpeterians has been: if the people are so irrational that it would be foolish 
and dangerous to have them participate politically more than the bare electoral 
minimum, how is it that they are worthy of having the vote at all? Ian Budge (1996, 
and this volume) reminds us eloquently that arguments against direct democracy 
- or, for present purposes, for less democracy stand in danger of becoming 
arguments against democracy of any sort. 
It is here that the final theme I wish to develop against deliberative models of 
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democracy comes in. The logic of these models is exclusive rather than demo­
cratically inclusive. Claus Offe (1997), in one of the most effective discussions of 
deliberation and democracy: expresses considerable concern about the exclusive 
implications of the deliberative model. He is prepared to accept arguments 
that we might discount people's preferences in democratic politics where those 
preferences would not serve the welfare of the people concerned. However, he 
argues, it is quite another thing to downgrade, exclude or Ignore preferences 
because of their origins, rather than their content: 
No doubt, as it is imprudent in terms of individual and collective wdfare to 
pursue preferences that violate standards of \,velfare, government is free to 
ignore or to actively try to change such preferences. But is this also true 
regarding preferences \\/hich are quite neutral in terms of their welfare effects, 
but just happen to differ from those that disinterested and virtuous citizens 
might adopt as the outcome of a deliberative collective judgement? I doubt it. 
(J 997: 98). 
He goes on to argue that 'the division of the universe of human preferences into 
those that are "prepolitical" and those that originate from "citizens" in the fullest 
sense of the word' is both exclusive (anti-egalitarian) and arbitrary (1997: 98). 
Just what do deliberative democrats propose to do with non-deliberative 
preferences and to the political rights of those who persist in holding them? At a 
basic democratic leveL if you exclude arguments you exclude people. Perhaps this 
is one reason deliberationists do not talk much about voting; they are not too keen 
Oil the idea that (mere, non-reflective, non-deliberative, prepolitical preference­
based) votes should be decisive. But surely equal votes of equal \'alue for equal 
citizens is a non-optional democratic baseline? Surely: too, because we cannot rely 
on a deliberative consensus, we must recognize that 'the everyday institutions of 
democratic rule such as voting are ... the heart of democracy, for they define how 
the umpire operates' (Gaus 1997: 23·t)? Anct contrary to the deliberationist thrust, 
it is voting that authorizes government composition and action (Przeworski 1998: 
1+2). 
Conclusion 
IVluch more would need to be said fully to substantiate the critique offered here: to 
that extent my comments are suggestive. That said, the arguments do suggest that 
the 'deliberative model of democracy' has involved some careless, overblown 
elaims about democratic legitimation; that core threads of that model rely on a 
metaphorical architecture which serves directly to undermine a range of core 
claims; and that (to say the least) advocates have paid insufficient attention to 
exclusivist, rather than democratically inclusive, implications of the model. 
Perhaps the overarching point to be made ill this context is that there is no such 
thing there can be no such thing - as 'the deliberative model of democracy'. 
Deliberation, of a certain kind. is of course a desirable feature of a health;.~ 
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functioning, dynamic democratic system. But such systems to state what ought 
to be obvious also require much more: constitutional structures; formal (and to 
some degree hierarchical) organizations; voting and other decision mechanisms 
that can be decisive in the last instance; and institutionalized equal respect for all 
citizens regardless of (for example) their willingness or even capacity to engage in 
deliberation or other distinctive forms of political participation. Does this mean 
that democratic decisions can be wrong, ill-informed, misguided, reflective of nOIl­
deliberative preferences? Of course. Perfectionist desires cannot make that [act go 
away. In the end, as Dahl says, democracy is a 'gamble that a people, in acting 
autonomously, will learn to act rightly' (Dahl 1989: ] 92). 
One last point: surely a key response to deliberative concerns about ill-informed 
preferences lies in inclusive voter education, rather than in the elitist, exclusive 
threads of the 'deliberative model'. Life-long learning, citizenship education in 
schools, new 'enabling' institutions, creative use of the media these are some of 
the routes by which democracy might be brought to the people. I see no reason 
why, for example, the deliberative polls of Fishkin and Luskin (Chapter 1) should 
not playa part. Once we have set aside the 'deliberative model of democracy') we 
can begin to take seriously how structured deliberation between real citizens might 
be a revitalizing element of a more democratic future. 
Notes 
Key deliberationists are subject to the criticism that Sartori (1987) effectively aimed at 
'participatory democrats' such as Peter Bachrach, namely the contrast of a real system 
(in our case, aggregative) with an ideal one (deliberative). The ideal ",rill inevitably come 
out shining in any such contrast, less for its substantive superiority and more for the way 
the contrast is set up in the first place. 
2 	Clearl)~ this critique of Cohen only works as a critique of deliberative democracy more 
generally if Cohen's approach is in key senses representative of the broader canon. 
Fishkin (1991, and this volume), for example, makes fewer claims about legitimacy, and 
so is less vulnerable to this critique. I would argue that Benhabib (1996a) is vulnerable, 
with her expansive claims about deliberation and legitimation. Though more would 
need to be said to substantiate these points, I hope to have shown at least that many 
deliberative democrats have a case to answer. 
